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I. INTRODUCTION
A group of entrepreneurial recent college graduates starts a
tutoring and test prep company focused on helping promising high
school students get an edge on their college applications. Since the
cost of print advertising exceeds the group's budget, they each actively
promote the business on their personal social media accounts,
garnering their first clients. They also create company accounts on
Facebook, Linkedln, and Twitter, which clients join for easy, direct
communication and quick access to information. Though all the
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founders contribute occasional posts and encourage their personal
social media contacts to join the company accounts, one eventually
becomes, in practice if not in name, the primary manager of the
company's social media activity.
But soon the founders begin to differ over the direction in
which their burgeoning business should grow. Eventually the social
media manager leaves to start a competing tutoring and test prep
company. She immediately changes both the name on the social media
accounts to the name of her new company and the passwords of each
account to ensure that her former associates cannot access them.
Who has the superior rights to the contacts that these social
media sites facilitate? All of the original founders cultivated the
company's social media contact list by promoting it on their personal
accounts. Yet one of them in particular actually maintained the
company accounts, engaged with their followers, and actively sought
out new contacts. In hindsight, the company should have articulated a
clear social media policy, but the founders were preoccupied with more
salient concerns about their fledgling business. Though only
hypothetical, this scenario is hardly inconceivable, especially given
social media's increasing importance to businesses both large and
small.
Social media now pervade not only individuals' personal lives
but also professional and business spheres. Companies of all sizes
have discovered that a social media presence is practically a necessity
to compete in nearly any industry. Some companies now hire
employees specifically to manage their social media accounts, tasking
them with such duties as updating information, holding online
promotions, or communicating directly with clients or customers. Even
so, the line demarcating individuals' identities and personal
relationships from their employment identities and professional
relationships is not always clear.1
Because of the unique nature of social media, this question
does not fit neatly into existing legal boxes. Categorical intellectual
property regimes designed to protect original works or unique
inventions do not directly address access to a group of existing or
potential customers. Even the law of trade secrets, though seemingly
more adaptable than other intellectual property regimes, only
partially addresses businesses' varied uses of social media. The
amorphous boundary between an individual's professional and
1. See Zoe Argento, Whose Social Network Account? A 74ade Secret Approach to Allocating
Rights, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 201, 204-05 (2013) (discussing how social media
blurs personal and professional roles).
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personal personas on social media conflates public and private
spheres, thereby placing the interests of employees, employers, and
the public at issue. However, where this boundary falls may vary
widely in each social media case and therefore warrants a fact-specific
inquiry that accounts for the unique context of social media.
This Note will suggest a framework for addressing the
challenges posed by the question of rights to employment-related
social media accounts and, more particularly, their contacts. Part II
will introduce social media sites. In particular, it will discuss three
major examples of social media sites, their value in the employment
context for the various parties involved, and how they blur a
company's persona with that of the individual maintaining the
account. Part III will examine and evaluate potential legal
frameworks for conceptualizing and resolving this issue. In particular,
it will examine areas of intellectual property law that previously
resolved similar questions of rights to intangible property as between
an employer and employee. Finally, Part IV will suggest a resolution
by drawing on the usage of flexible principles of agency law in
intellectual property regimes. It imports patent law's shop-right rule
and hired-to-invent doctrine to determine and assign rights to a social
media account and its followers.
Throughout, this Note will focus on the so-called big three2
social media sites: Facebook, Linkedln, and Twitter. Among the most
popular3 and oldest4 ongoing social media sites, these three are more
likely to be both familiar to readers and the focus of future litigation,
in addition to demonstrating some of the most common features of
social media.
II. "You ARE WHAT You TWEET":5 A SOCIAL MEDIA PRIMER
Within only the past decade, a shift has occurred in how people
use social media sites. They achieved their first wave of popularity by
appealing to individuals, providing a platform that reflected and
2. Kelly Dingee, Who Do Your Tweets Represent? You? Or Your Employer?, FISTFUL OF
TALENT (Jan. 24, 2011), http://fistfuloftalent.com/2011/01/personal-branding-management-
lesson-2-from-a-stalkerahemsourcer.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5RDY-B9NU.
3. See Top Sites, QUANTCASE, https://www.quantcast.com/top-sites, archived at http:/
perma.cc/ 5P7G-RL6T (last visited Jan. 13, 2014) (ranking Facebook, Twitter, and Linkedln in
the top twenty most popular websites as measured by number of visitors per month, four other
social media sites rank among the top twenty).
4. See danah m. boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and
Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 212 (2007).
5. Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/tos, archived at http://perma.cc/H9N3-
H9T8 (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
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enhanced existing real-life relationships by facilitating online
communication and interaction.6 Over time, as social media grew ever
more popular and varied, businesses began to use them to interact
with existing customers and attract new ones.7 Social media sites
accordingly adapted to suit the needs of companies, which differed
from the personal needs of individuals.
Broadly, a social networking site is one that enables users to
"(1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system,
(2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection,
and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by
others within the system."8 An examination of each of these features
in Facebook, Twitter, and Linkedln helps explain exactly what is at
stake in determining rights to social media connections.
A. Facebook
Facebook offers two versions of public profiles: the Personal
Timeline (or "Profile") and the Page.9 The former provides a forum for
individual users and cannot be used "primarily for [the user's] own
commercial gain."10 It accommodates broad personal information
including name, basic demographic information, educational and job
history, and personal interests." Pages, on the other hand, are
designed for "business[es], brand[s] or product[s]" 12 to post company
information, promote upcoming events, and communicate with the
public.13 Facebook permits multiple users to access and manage
6. Argento, supra note 1, at 209; see Tiffany A. Miao, Access Denied: How Social Media
Accounts Fall Outside the Scope oflatellectual Property Law and into the Realm of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA& ENT. L.J. 1017, 1021 (2013).
7. Argento, supra note 1, at 209; Miao, supra note 6, at 1022.
8. See boyd & Ellison, supra note 4, at 211.
9. Pages Basics, FACEBOOK DESKTOP HELP, https://www.facebook.com/help/, archived at
http:/ perma.cc/7RF5-B6EX?type=image (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
10. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/
terms, archived at http://perma.ce/C5L9-LEA3?type=source (last visited Feb. 21, 2014); How Are
Pages Different from Personal 7imelines?, FACEBOOK DESKTOP HELP, https://www.facebook.com/
help /www/217671661585622, archived at http://perma.ce/5SPJ-X83U?type=image (last visited
Feb. 21, 2014).
11. 7imeline, FACEBOOK DESKTOP HELP, https://www.facebook.com/help/
467610326601639/, archived at http://perma.ce/E8DP-D6KG?type=image (last visited Feb. 21,
2014).
12. Should I Create a Page or Allow People to Follow My Public Updates from My Personal
Account? FACEBOOK DESKTOP HELP, https://www.facebook.com/help/www/
203141666415461?rdrhc, archived at http://perma.cc/D9ME-BGJ4?type=image (last visited Feb.
21, 2014).
13. How Are Pages Different From Personal §Jmelines?, supra note 10.
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PageS14 but requires managers to have personal Profiles.15 Logging on
to the Page requires logging on to one's Profile.16 Both Pages and
Profiles allow users to post news articles, photos, or comments that
are publicly visible.
Facebook Profiles and Pages have different mechanisms for
creating links to other users. For individual users to connect (by
"friending" each other), both parties must consent.17 Individual users
connect with (become "fans" of) Pages simply by pushing a "like"
button;18 the Page manager's consent is not required.19 Facebook gives
individual users access to friends' profiles and Pages' information.
"Friends" and "fans" automatically receive updates about their
connections, such as new status updates or posts to a Page, what their
connections have "liked," and events that individuals are attending or
that businesses are planning, among other things.
Facebook can provide businesses with valuable information
based on their lists of contacts. In addition to providing Page
administrators with demographic data about their fans,20 Facebook
measures users' "engagement" with a Page.21 For example, it records
how many fans like and comment on a post and provides information
about the time and location of fan activity. Thus, Pages' contacts help
businesses gauge the effectiveness of various messages.22
Furthermore, contacts beget contacts: when a user sees that a friend
likes a Page, that user may investigate the business and like it
herself.23 In addition, Facebook provides a platform for people with
common interests to converge and a mechanism for their existing
contacts to see what they are doing, and participate as well, extending
the network of people affiliated with a particular group or person.
Thus, a list of contacts provides a direct and nearly instantaneous




17. Finding Friends, FACEBOOK DESKTOP HELP, https://www.facebook.com/help/
336320879782850/, archived at http://perma.ce/QBG2-F28X?type=image/ (last visited Sept. 23,
2014).
18. How Are Pages Different from Personal fmelines, supra note 10.
19. Id.
20. Likes, Reach, and Engagement, FACEBOOK DESKTOP HELP, https://www.facebook.com/




23. Argento, supra note 1, at 210-11.
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in the message.24 Finally, Facebook humanizes businesses both by
attracting attention to them via users existing personal connections
and by allowing Page managers to post conversational messages in an
informal setting.25
Despite creating distinct platforms for individual users and
businesses, Facebook's personal and professional use blurs
organically.26 A third-party guide for businesses using Facebook tells
readers that, to get the most out of the site, they should be
"transparent and authentic" because "people like to connect with
people, not faceless brands."27 It stresses that "it is these personal
connections that will lead to business, referrals, and word-of-mouth
marketing."2 8 In fact, despite Facebook's efforts to help businesses
promote themselves, data indicate that Pages are not the best way to
communicate with customers.29 Although Pages can improve visibility
when businesses pay for Facebook advertising, this obviates the
advantage of free and broadly disseminated publicity that social
media offer to small or new businesses without large advertising
budgets.30 Such businesses might find it more beneficial to promote
themselves exclusively through their employees' profiles.
24. Facebook Basics: Facebook Can Help You Reach All the People who Matter Most to Your
Business, FACEBOOK FOR BUSINESS, https://www.facebook.com/business/overview, archived at
http://perma.cc/BL85-XMBN (last visited Sept. 29, 2014) ("Your Page can help you reach large
groups of people frequently, with messages tailored to their needs and interests.").
25. Argento, supra note 1, at 214-15.
26. See id. at 215-22 (discussing why and how this occurs), Elise Wile, Good Ways To Invite
Friends to Your Business Facebook Page, SMALLBUSINESS.CHRON.COM, http:/
smallbusiness.chron.com/good-ways-invite-friends-business-facebook-21270.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/L2UN-WKE3 (last visited Sept. 3, 2014) (suggesting ways for business owners to
persuade existing personal friends to connect with them on Facebook).
27. HUBSPOT, How to Use Facebook for Business 11 (2013), available at http:/
cdn2.hubspot.net/hub/53/blog/docs/facebook for business ebook hubspot.pdf, archived at http:/
perma.cc/BRR9-KJRC (emphasis added).
28. Id.
29. See Stephanie Chandler, Should You Leave Facebook? EdgeRank Confusion, Promoted
Posts, and Why Small Business Owners Are Exceedingly Frustrated, FORBES (April 22, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/work -in-progress/2013/04/22/should-you-leave-facebook- edgerank-
confusion-promoted-posts-and-why-small-business-owners-are-exceedingly-frustrated/, archived
at http://perma.cc/3E36-JLGZ/ (noting that only five to ten percent of a Page's fans may see a
post).
30. See Katie Chun, Why Facebook Matters for Nonprofits, THE EVALUATION EXCHANGE,
Spring 2010, at 21, available at http://www.hfrp.org/var/hfrp /storage/ original/application/
b09c074129f1943b4a172d23fb8542b5.p df, archived at http: p erma.cc /X59T-AQFZ (explaining
Facebook's usefulness for nonprofit fundraising and awareness raising in part because it is "cost-
free").
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B. Twitter
Twitter profiles only require a username ("handle") but give
users the option of posting profile photos, their locations, affiliated
websites, and brief bios.3 1 Twitter users communicate in "tweets,"
"short, disconnected messageS"32 of no more than 140 characters.33 To
create lists of contacts, users "follow" other users, whether people with
whom they have offline relationships, organizations, or celebrities.34
Unless the user has activated certain privacy settings, this does not
require consent of the user being followed.35 Once connected, a
follower automatically receives the followed user's tweets. The
followed user only receives the first follower's tweets if she, in turn,
follows that person.36 The names of both whom a user follows and who
follows any particular user are public. Unlike Facebook, Twitter does
not provide broad personal information about users. Instead, it
provides a direct channel of communication to people who have
already demonstrated their interest in another user (whether because
of that user personally or that user's association with a particular
entity) by electing to follow that user's account. Furthermore,
followers can "retweet" other users' posts so that the posts appear on
their pages, visible to their own followers. This provides an
opportunity for publicity and for attracting new followers who may, in
turn, become customers.
Twitter encourages use by both individuals and businesses
without distinguishing between the types of accounts it offers to
each.3 7 In fact, Twitter's own instructions indicate that it is most
valuable when users successfully blend their public and personal
selves, advising users that "[w]hat you say [and] how you say
31. New User FAQs, TWITTER HELP CENTER, https:/support.twitter.com/groups /50-
welcome-to-twitter/topics/203-faqs/articles/13920-new-user-faqs#, archived at http://perma.ce/
EB9U-25YH?type=source (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
32. Charlene Kingston, How to Use Twitter for Business and Marketing, SOCIAL MEDIA
EXAMINER, http://www.socialmediaexaminer.com/how-to-use-twitter-for-business-and-
marketing/, archivedathttp://perma.cc/RFL9-B3E4 (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
33. New User FAQs, supra note 31.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Getting Started with Twitter, TWITTER HELP CENTER, https:/support.twitter.com/
articles/215585#, archived at http://perma.cc/TN3B-MK7Y?type=source (last visited Sept. 23,
2014).
37. See Terms of Service, supra note 5 (providing for the user to "accept[] these Terms and
us[e] the Services on behalf of a company, organization, government, or other legal entity").
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it ... [has] a tremendous impact on customer relationships"38 and that
they should ensure their "content and interaction stays authentic and
conversational."39 It even urges companies not to "be afraid to let
[their] personalit[ies] come through, or [those] of [their] employees,"
and suggests that, since employees may have personal accounts, the
business owner can "mention them when what they are tweeting
about meshes nicely with [the] business'[s] interests and goals."40
C. Linkedln
Linkedln's features mirror Facebook's but it focuses on its
users' professional lives. Like Facebook, it offers options for two
different types of users. Individuals' personal Profiles list their current
and previous employment, educational histories, and skills and
expertise, among other things.4 1 Companies can create Pages to
communicate with the general public by posting general business
information, job openings, and news. Like Facebook, Linkedln
provides analytical data about how its users are engaging with it.42
For example, it measures how many times a Linkedln user saw,
commented on, or shared a Page update; user demographics based on
categories such as industry and seniority; and trends in how a Page's
number of users has varied over time, to name a few things.4 3 To
create a contact, one user asks another to connect, and the other must
accept. Once users connect, they have access to each other's Profiles or
Pages. On the other hand, individual users can connect to a business's
page without the business's consent.
Linkedln helps individuals promote themselves professionally
and helps employers attract and engage with customers. It envisions
38. Establish Your Brand Personality, TWITTER FOR BUSINESS, https://business.twitter.com/
establish-your-brand-personality, archived at http://perma.ce/3P7D-86PG?type=source (last
visited Feb. 21, 2014).
39. Work with Others, TWITTER FOR BUSINESS, https://business.twitter.com/work-others,
archived at http://perma.ce/KC34-SDPL?type=source (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
40. TWITTER FOR BUSINESS, Twitter for Small Business: A Guide to Get Started 7, available
at https:/g.twimg.com/business/pdfs/TwitterSmallbizGuide.pdf, archived at http://perma.ce/
Q76L-VQLQ.
41. See LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/, archived at http://perma.ce/4RF9-
6HUK?type=image (last visited Sept. 29, 2014).
42. Viewing Analytical Data About Your Company or Showcase Page, LINKEDIN HELP
CENTER, http://help.linkedin.com/app/answers/detail/a-id/4499, archived at http://perma.cc/976S-
NTK9?type=image (last visited Sept. 29, 2014).
43. Analytics Tab for Company Pages, LINKEDIN HELP CENTER,
http://help.linkedin.com/app/ answers/detail/a id/26032/ft/eng, archived at http://perma.ce/ZV37-
SV6Z?type=image (last visited Sept. 23, 2014).
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use primarily by individuals, rather than corporate entities,44
although it acknowledges that users may access it on behalf of a
business.45 When the business's employees manage Pages, those
employees' personalities and creative choices combine with the
company's reputation to attract connections and potential clients.
Someone researching a company can look at both the company's Page
and the personal pages of its employees, even if that person is not
connected to the employees.46 Conversely, a user may want to connect
with an individual because of that individual's affiliation with a
particular business. As one user described her Linkedln experience,
"[E]ngaging in conversation ... has increased my visibility, which is
great for [my employer] as well." 4 7 However, unlike on Facebook
Linkedln users do not generally engage in regular public posts; rather,
the focus is on maintaining an updated Profile or Page and engaging
in one-on-one conversations.
Like Twitter, Linkedln's own advice to businesses on
maximizing their use of the site blurs the line between personal and
professional use. It tells users: "In the world of small business, the
lines between personal and company branding is thin[.] Your
company's brand is your brand[.]" 4 8 It urges businesses to encourage
their employees to connect their Company Pages to their Linkedln or
other social media profiles.49 Thus, a user looking for someone with a
particular skill set might come across an individual's profile, notice
the link to that person's Company Page, and become a customer of the
company thanks, ultimately, to the attributes of the individual
employee.
44. See User Agreement, LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement,
archived at http://perma.cc/99UZ-P2M8?type=source (last visited Sept. 3, 2014) ("To be eligible to
use [Linkedln], you must . . . only maintain one Linkedln account at any given time; . . . use your
real name . .. ."); see also id. ("As a condition to access Linkedln, you agree to . .. [u]se your real
name on your profile. . . . Don't undertake the following[:] . . . Publish inaccurate information in
the designated fields on the profile form . . . [or c]reate a Member profile for anyone other than a
natural person . . .").
45. See id. ("If you are using Linkedln on behalf of a company or other legal entity, you are
nevertheless individually bound by this Agreement . .. .") (emphasis added).
46. Jennifer Beese, How Business Can Use Linkedla to Amplify Their Brands, SPROUT
SOCIAL (Sept. 6, 2013), https:/sproutsocial.com/insights/2013/09/linkedin-amplify-brand-tips/,
archived at http://perma.cc/FP2B-Q93B (emphasis added).
47. Heather Caliendo, Businesses Thru to Twitter for Networking, Feedback from Clients,
THE J. REC. (Mar. 23, 2009), available at http://www.littlefield.us/news/businesses-turn-twitter-
networking-feedback-clients, archived at http://perma.cc/85XM-9QZ7.
48. David Schneider, 20 ifps to Amplify Your Brank on Linkedla [Slideshow], OFFICIAL
LINKEDIN BLOG (Sept. 5, 2013), http://blog.linkedin.com/2013/09/05/20-tips-to-amplify-your-
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These illustrations indicate certain commonalities among social
media sites. The value of the list of contacts associated with a social
media account depends in part on the individual attributes or
personality of the employee or employees managing the account. For
example, on Linkedln a recruiter may find a profile interesting based
on its owner's personal achievements as well as its presentation. A
Twitter user may gain a following by becoming known for her
insightful comments on a particular subject or unique sense of
humor.50 Furthermore, while each site provides different kinds of
information about a user's contacts, any social media contact list
amounts to more than a mere series of names. The difficulty of
assessing the value of social media contacts is due, in part, to the
impossibility of divorcing the contacts from the account itself, which is
what provides direct communication with, and access to, a group of
people most likely to be interested in the communication. Social media
accounts also provide varying degrees of ancillary information, such as
demographics, location, and work experience, among other things,
which can be enormously helpful in developing a marketing plan.51
Finally, social media humanizes what otherwise could be an
impersonal corporate entity, making it more approachable to
customers.
III. ADDRESSING RIGHTS TO SOCIAL MEDIA FOLLOWERS WITH
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FRAMEWORKS
Corporate social media users can preemptively resolve the
question of rights to a social media account's followers by addressing it
in employment contracts or company policies. However, young
companies, perhaps the most likely to rely on social media, may not
have social media policies, or even formal employment contracts, in
place. Moreover, while awareness of social media's many potential
pitfalls has grown in the workplace, the response focuses almost
exclusively on defining employees' privacy rights over personal social
media accounts or personal account access while at work. Therefore, if
50. An example in the legal community of an otherwise private person who has gained
public attention due to his Twitter use is Judge Stephen Dillard of the Court of Appeals of
Georgia, who has been called a "Twitter icon" for tweeting thoughts such as "Dillard, J.,
consciously uncoupling from the majority opinion." David Lat, Best Parenthetical Ever?, ABOVE
THE LAW (Mar. 28, 2014), http://abovethelaw.com/2014/03/best-parenthetical-ever/, archived at
http://perma.cc/QE3J-BGDR; Joe Patrice, Non-Sequiturs 5.20.14, ABOVE THE LAW (May 20,
2014), http:/ abovethelaw.com/?s=judge+dillard, archived at http://perma.cc/4KVQ-ZF23. Judge
Dillard's Twitter page is available at https://twitter.com/JudgeDillard.
51. See Likes, Reach, and Engagement, supra note 20; Viewing Analytical Data, supra note
42.
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they exist at all, social media policies may not address the issue of
rights to social media contacts.
While the growth of social media clearly raises complex new
issues, this is not the first time that the legal system has struggled to
accommodate concurrent personal and professional rights to
intangible interests. This Part explores how the law has previously
resolved similar problems and how those resolutions might apply to
the issue of rights to social media followers.
A. Trade Secrets
At first glance, the issue of social media account followers
appears to fall neatly into trade secrets law, especially as it relates to
customer or client lists. Indeed, a few complaints alleging trade
secrets infringement for using a social media contact list have
survived motions to dismiss or for summary judgment.52 However, as
this Part will show, the trade secrets framework, while providing
attractive fact-specificity, does not directly address the problem.
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA") offers an outline of
the typical approach to trade secrets among the states. The Uniform
Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (amended 1985),53 which forty-six states have
adopted in some form, 54 defines a trade secret as:
Information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.5 5
Most courts use a variation of the factor test promulgated in the
Restatement of Torts § 757 cmt. b (1939) to determine whether a trade
secret exists:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside the particular business, (2) the
extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the particular business,
52. See PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2012 WL 273323, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
30, 2012) (PhoneDog II); Christou v. Beatport, LLC, 849 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1075 (D. Colo. 2012);
infra Part III.A.3.
53. The Restatement of Torts § 757 cmt. b (1939) and Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition § 43 (1995) also define Trade Secret in manners similar, though not identical, to the
UTSA definition. See generally Ari B. Good, §Jade Secrets and the New Realities of the Internet
Age, 2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 51 (1998) (extrapolating on the different definitions).
However, because the UTSA was promulgated in the interest of creating nationwide uniformity
in the definition of trade secrets, and because it has now been adopted by forty-seven states, it
alone will be discussed here.
54. See Erini R. Svokos, What About the Client?, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 937, 940 (2011)
("This act has been enacted in whole in all but four states.").
55. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985).
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(3) the extent of measures taken by the particular business to guard the secrecy of the
information, (4) the value of the information to the particular business and to its
competitors, (5) the amount of effort or money expended by the particular business in
developing the information, and (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information
could be properly acquired or duplicated by others, in determining the existence of a
trade secret.56
The UTSA defines misappropriation of trade secrets, in relevant part,
as "[d]isclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or
implied consent" by someone who either learned the trade secret
through improper means or "knew or had reason to know" that she
learned the trade secret "under circumstances giving rise to a duty to
maintain its secrecy or limit its use . . . ." 57
Trade secrets apply most obviously to technical information or
methods, the most famous perhaps being Coca-Cola's syrup recipe.58
Thus, much of what trade secrets law protects, patent law would also
protect.5 9 However, trade secrets law reaches a broader field of subject
matter than patent law,60 including nontechnical information such as,
in some circumstances, customer lists.6 1 More obviously, unlike patent
law, trade secrets law does not require public disclosure of the
information at issue; quite the contrary, it requires that information
be secret.62
Trade secrets law is premised on a number of legal theories,
including tort, contract, property, and fiduciary duties grounded in
agency law. 6 3 While courts' analyses rely on each of these theories in
56. Jasmine McNealy, Who Owns Your Friends?, 39 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH L. J. 30,
37 (2013).
57. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (emphasis added).
58. MICHAEL D. SCOTT, SCOTT ON MULTIMEDIA LAW § 7.01 (Wolters Kluwer ed., 3d ed. 2008
& Supp. 2009-2013).
59. Id.
60. Kewanee Oil Co., v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484-85 (1974) ("Trade secret law will
encourage invention in areas where patent law does not reach . . . . [T]he public is not deprived of
the use of valuable, if not quite patentable, invention.").
61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. F (1995) ("The general rules
that govern trade secrets are applicable to the protection of information relating to the identity
and requirements of customers."); see also, e.g., Am. Credit Indem. Co. v. Sacks, 262 Cal. Rptr. 92
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (creditor insurance underwriter's customer list); Stampede Tool Warehouse,
Inc. v. May, 651 N.E.2d 209 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (automotive tools distributor's customer list);
Fred Siegel Co., L.P.A. v. Arter & Hadden, 707 N.E.2d 853 (Ohio 1999) (law firm client list).
62. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985).
63. See Charles Tait Graves, §Jade Secrets as Property: Theory and Consequences, 15 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 39, 41 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of §eating §&ade
Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 319-28 (2008) (considering the viability of each theory
in turn); see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (holding that trade
secrets constitute property entitled to protection under the Takings Clause); Francisco J.
Morales, Comment, The Property Matrix: An Analytical Tool to Answer the Question, "Is This
Property?," 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1125, 1154-55 (2013).
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ways that vary over time and across jurisdictions,64 the last two seem
the most prevalent.
1. Trade Secrets as Property
The property theory focuses on the actual value of information,
which directly depends on its secrecy.65 Providing redress for
misappropriation of trade secrets also reflects the property theory's
goal of encouraging investment in developing valuable information.66
In addition, protecting against the threat of theft encourages
companies to disclose information to those employees who can most
efficiently use it, while reducing the costs the employer would have to
expend to ensure secrecy absent legal protection.67
The metes and bounds of a trade secret are measured by its
secrecy and, closely related, its value to its holder.68 The first three
factors of the Restatement's test measure the degree of the
information's secrecy.69 A court will only provide redress for
misappropriation if the information's holder took affirmative steps to
keep it confidential.70 Unlike patent or copyright law,71 under which
an author or inventor has exclusive rights over information that is or
will become public,72 trade secrets law confers a right of exclusivity
only as long as the holder maintains the information's secrecy.
Thus, the parameters of a trade secret are not fixed but may
vary with how well the secret owner guards the information and how
much of it she guards.73 As the Supreme Court has recognized, "the
extent of the property right ... is defined by the extent to which the
owner of the secret protects his interest from disclosure to others."74
Since different information requires-and different industries offer-
64. Graves, supra note 63, at 46-57 (describing cases in which courts applied primarily
either the property or "relational" (fiduciary duty) theories, and how those theories influenced
the outcome of the cases); Lemley, supra note 63, at 324-25.
65. Good, supra note 53, at 64.
66. Lemley, supra note 63, at 319, 329-32.
67. Id. at 334.
68. Good, supra note 53, at 64.
69. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. B (1939); Good, supra note 53, at 64-65
(comparing the Restatement and the UTSA approaches to trade secrets).
70. Douglas R. Richmond, Yours, Mine, and Ours: Law Firm Property Disputes, 30 N. ILL.
U. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2009).
71. See infra Part III.B (discussing copyright and patent law).
72. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 271; see also Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 376
U.S. 225, 229 (1964) ("The grant of a patent is the grant of a statutory monopoly.").
73. Steven Wilf, §Jade Secrets, Property and Social Relations, 34 CONN. L. REV. 787, 791
(2002) ("[T]rade secrets become propertyonly if third-party access is vigilantly policed.").
74. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984).
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varying levels of secrecy, determining whether something is a trade
secret is a highly fact-driven inquiry. Information need only be subject
to efforts at secrecy that are "reasonable under the circumstances,"7 5
allowing courts wide latitude. For example, some jurisdictions
recognize law firms' client lists as trade secrets under the theory that
while the clients' identities are publicly available, their ancillary
information, such as contact information or billing rates, generally is
not.76
The property theory underlying trade secrets law also requires
the information at issue to confer independent economic value to its
holder.77 The value and secrecy aspects are intertwined because the
value must both derive from being secret and give the information's
holder a competitive economic advantage.78 While information that is
generally known in an industry may be valuable to all businesses in
that industry, it does not give any one business an edge over another
and thus does not merit trade secrets protection.79 It may be well
known within an industry that a particular product appeals to a
certain demographic, so companies may tell their social media
managers to seek out that demographic. Since the information is
generally known, trade secrets law would not prevent the employee
from seeking out the same demographic on behalf of a subsequent
competitor employer.
The last three factors of the Restatement's trade secrets test
address this value aspect.80 The effort or money expended in compiling
the list and the ease or difficulty of replication81 are relevant to this
part of the inquiry in certain trade secrets cases, particularly cases
determining whether customer lists are trade secrets.8 2 Some courts
have given weight to these factors when applying a trade secrets
75. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (amended 1985).
76. Sarah Osborn Hill, I Quit and I am Taking My Patents with Me!, 53 FED. LAW., MAY
2006, at 12.
77. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i).
78. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974); Good, supra note 53, at 68.
79. Good, supra note 53, at 68.
80. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. O'Dowd, No. 3:06-0434, 2006 WL 3053408 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 26,
2006); Weberaft Techs., Inc. v. McCaw, 674 F. Supp. 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (discussing the
importance of customer lists); Arnold's Ice Cream Co. v. Carlson, 330 F. Supp. 1185 (E.D.N.Y.
1971) (holding a customer list a trade secret because significant effort, advertising, time, and
money were expended to assemble the list); Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997) (holding that customer lists were of economic value and were generally not known to
the public); Al Minor & Assoc., Inc. v. Martin, 881 N.E.2d 850 (Ohio 2008) (holding that the
employer's client list was a trade secret, and was therefore UTSA protected).
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analysis to social media contacts.83 When courts grant customer lists
trade secrets protection, they often stress the length of the customer
list at issue; the longer and more complex the list, the more it merits
protection.84 While courts may well recognize that a short list of select
clientele may have great economic value to a particular business,
trade secrets law focuses on value as a product of secrecy. Thus, trade
secrets law would generally only offer protection to client lists that
would be difficult for a competitor to reproduce.
The secrecy and closely related value requirements pose the
first obstacle to treating social media account contact lists as trade
secrets, despite the broad secrecy standard. By design, secrecy is not a
necessary attribute of social media. Since its value derives from
providing visibility, information, and an efficient channel of
communication with existing and potential customers, the company
benefits when the contact list is not secret. For example, social media
users may learn about a company and decide to follow it when they
see that one of their connections is following it.
In addition to the property theory underlying trade secrets law,
courts often cite theories of common-law fiduciary duties in trade
secrets cases. From this perspective, trade secrets law provides
redress for unfair competition or unjust enrichment, while still
encouraging competition. The UTSA accomplishes these dual
objectives by targeting those who have a duty to protect the trade
secret but allowing third parties to discover the information
independently with impunity.85
2. Trade Secrets and Fiduciary Duty
Under a fiduciary duty theory, trade secrets merit protection
because divulging them violates the employment relationship. Chief
Justice Holmes stressed this concept in the seminal trade secrets case
E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. r. Masland:
Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant knows the
facts... through a special confidence that he accepted. The property may be denied, but
the confidence cannot be. Therefore, the starting point for the present matter is not
83. Christou v. Beatport, LLC, 849 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1076 (D. Colo. 2012), Eagle v.
Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2011 WL 6739448, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2011) (Eagle1).
84. Robert W. Hillman, The Property Wars of LawFirms: Of Client Lists, §&ade Secrets and
the Fiduciary Duties of Law Partners, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 767, 774 (2003).
85. Lemley, supra note 63, at 322.
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property... but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs, or
one of them.86
Thus, among the frequently cited policy rationales behind trade
secrets law is the maintenance of commercial ethics.8 7 The UTSA's
definition of misappropriation of a trade secret further reflects this
concern: sections 1(4)(ii)(B)(II) and (III) find misappropriation in
situations involving a duty to maintain secrecy or limit use of the
information.
Because a duty to maintain the secrecy of social media contacts
only arises out of certain relationships, this aspect of trade secrets law
is particularly inapt to apply to social media contact list ownership.
The very difficulty is that it is so often unclear whether an employee
takes action on social media in her personal capacity, as opposed to
her professional capacity. Trade secrets law itself does not provide a
method for determining whether the relationship between the parties
claiming rights to social media contacts is such that it creates a duty
not to appropriate those contacts. To resolve this, courts look
elsewhere, such as to contract and agency law, to determine the
nature of the relationship.88
3. Trade Secrets in the Internet Age: How Courts Have Treated Social
Media Contact Lists
In the few cases to arise on the issue of rights to social media
contacts so far, courts have emphasized different aspects of trade
secrets law to fit it to the social media contacts inquiry. The court in
Christou v. Beatport, emphasized the length and complexity of a list of
social media contacts.89 Regas Christou founded a number of
nightclubs in Denver, some of which gained national recognition in the
electronic dance music community.90 His employees included Bradley
86. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917) (emphasis
added); see also Dan L. Burk, Colloquium: Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71U. CHI. L. REV.
3, 3, 11 (2004) ("[A]t best [trade secrecy] confers an incomplete property right . . . only as against
a limited number of individuals that stand in a confidential relationship with the proprietor.")
(emphasis added).
87. E.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) ("The maintenance of
standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention are the broadly stated
policies behind trade secrets law."); Fred Siegel Co. v. Arter & Hadden, 707 N.E.2d 853, 862-63
(Ohio 1999); see also Good, supra note 53, at 64 ("One commentator has suggested that UTSA
continues to emphasize the deterrence of reprehensible commercial conduct.. . .").
88. See Lemley, supra note 63, at 327 (arguing that courts rely on a vague idea of
"emergent consensus . . . of what constitutes acceptable behavior" to decide whether the duty to
maintain a trade secret has been breached).
89. Christou v. Beatport, LLC, 849 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1076 (D. Colo. 2012).
90. Id. at 1062.
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Roulier, who used MySpace, a social media site structured nearly
identically to Facebook, to promote the clubs.91 Roulier built MySpace
profiles for certain of Christou's clubs, gathered contacts for each, and
promoted the clubs on them.92 While still working for Christou,
Roulier co-founded Beatport, an online marketplace for downloading
electronic dance music.9 3 Beatport became not only an enormous
commercial success but also an integral part of the electronic dance
music industry, so that whether an album was well promoted on it
could "make or break album sales."9 4 He also opened his own
nightclub.95 Christou later alleged that Roulier used his ownership of
Beatport to coerce DJs into performing at his venue rather than
Christou's by leveraging its ability to block access to, or remove all
artists on a DJ's label from, Beatport if the DJ performed at Christou's
clubs rather than Roulier's.96
Christou claimed Beatport misappropriated trade secrets when
Roulier used the MySpace profile log-in information and contacts,
arguing that the account's friends constituted customer lists, which
are trade secrets under Colorado law.9 7 Beatport maintained that the
account's friends did not constitute a trade secret because they were
merely a public list of names that anyone could reproduce.98 Denying
Beatport's motion to dismiss the trade secrecy claim, the court
emphasized that friending someone on MySpace allowed access to
ancillary information that was not available publicly: friends' contact
information and a means of direct contact.99 It also stressed that
Christou had "expended some amount of money, time, and resources
into developing [the] lists for promotional purposes."100 Furthermore,
while Roulier could theoretically have reproduced the contacts from a
separate account, this would have required contacting thousands of
people, not all of whom could have been guaranteed to accept the
91. Id. at 1076.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1062.
94. Id. at 1063 (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1075.
98. Id.
99. Id. Plaintiffs later withdrew the trade secrets claim. Christou v. Beatport, LLC, No. 10-
cv-02912-RBJ-KMT, 2014 WL 1293296, at *5 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2014).
100. Christou, 849 F. Supp. 2d at 1076.
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friend request.101 Therefore, recreating the list exactly within a
reasonable time frame was unlikely. 102
On the other hand, PhoneDog v. Kravitz, perhaps the best-
known case on this issue, focused on the economic implications of an
employee's actions on a former employer. Noah Kravitz was a product
reviewer at PhoneDog, a company that provided reviews and other
resources for customers to research mobile carriers. 103 All employees,
including Kravitz, had Twitter handles in the format
"@PhoneDog_[employee's first name]."10 4 His job entailed tweeting his
opinions about products, frequently linking to PhoneDog's website
through his Twitter account.105 Kravitz accumulated approximately
seventeen thousand followers in his four and a half years of
employment.106 When Kravitz left the company, PhoneDog requested
that he give it control of the account; instead Kravitz changed the
account's handle to @noahkravitz, changed the password, and
continued to post on it to promote himself and his new employer. 107
PhoneDog alleged that the account's followers and log-in
information constituted trade secrets.108 Kravitz argued that they
could not because the followers' identities were publicly available and
because the password did not derive "any actual or potential
independent economic value" and was merely a means of viewing
already public information.109 However, the court held that PhoneDog
had pleaded sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss,110 finding
that Kravitz had disrupted PhoneDog's economic relationships with
advertisers that provided much of PhoneDog's revenue.111 Advertisers
paid based on the number of page views they received from
PhoneDog's website, traffic that Kravitz's Twitter account fueled.112
Therefore, diverting those followers from PhoneDog's site potentially
101. Id.
102. Id.





107. Id. at *1. Kravitz's twitter feed is available at https://twitter.com/noahkravitz.
108. PhoneDog I, 2011 WL 5415612 at *1, *4.
109. Id. at *6, see also infra Part III.A (discussing trade secrets law).
110. PhoneDog I, 2011 WL 5415612 at *7.
111. Id. at *4.
112. Id.
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harmed PhoneDog's revenue.113 However, because the parties settled
out of court, it is not clear how a court would have ultimately ruled on
the merits of any of these issues.114
Sasqua Group, Inc. v. Courtney did not directly involve social
media, but discussions about rights to social media contacts have
frequently cited it because of its implications for the meaning of
"secret" in the internet age. Courtney was an employee of Sasqua, a
financial services recruiting company that maintained a database,
available only to its personnel, containing client data such as contact
information, profiles, hiring preferences, and work experience. 115 After
Courtney left to start her own recruiting company, 116 Sasqua alleged
that she used information from its database to contact and poach its
clients.117 Courtney argued that it was industry practice for financial
recruiters to perform searches on public databases, including social
media, and that the identities of Sasqua's clients were easily available
by searching such sites as Linkedln and Facebook.118
This court reached the opposite conclusion of that in Christou,
denying Sasqua's application for a temporary restraining order that
would prevent Courtney from using the clients' information on the
basis that it was a trade secret.119 Emphasizing the fact-sensitivity of
its inquiry, it concluded that while Sasqua maintained client
information on a confidential company database, it did not take
adequate steps to maintain that confidentiality. 120 Moreover, the court
stressed that the industry practice for locating and recruiting clients
meant that seeking this information independently was not
excessively cumbersome.121
Similarly, in Eagle v. Moran, the court held that a Linkedln
account with one thousand contacts did not constitute a trade secret.
Linda Eagle, co-founder of Edcomm, a banking education company,
began using Linkedln both for personal and business marketing
113. Id. at *3. PhoneDog priced each follower at $2.50 and sought damages of $340,000
($2.50 multiplied by 17,000). PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2012 WL 273323, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2012) (PhoneDog I).
114. Jasmine McNealy, Who Owns Your Friends? PhoneDog v. Kravitz and Business Claims
of §&ade Secret in Social Media Information, 39 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 30, 55 (2013).
115. Sasqua Group, Inc. v. Courtney, No. CV 10-528(ADS)(AKT), 2010 WL 3613855, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2010).
116. Id.
117. Id. at *3.
118. Id. at *6.
119. Id. at *23.
120. Id. at *5.
121. Id.
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purposes and encouraged other employees to do the same.122
Eventually the company actively involved itself in the content of
employees' accounts by developing guidelines on creating and using
them, including instituting requirements that they feature Edcomm
emails, use an Edcomm-created template, and include a link to
Edcomm's website.123 Eagle gave the company the password to her
account so that employees could update it on her behalf and conduct
other business-related activities on it.124
Conflict arose when Sawabeh Information Services Company
acquired Edcomm in 2010 and terminated Eagle's employment.125
Edcomm changed the password to Eagle's account, preventing her
from using it.126 Although Edcomm changed the name and information
on the account to that of Eagle's replacement, some of her information
remained, including her contacts.127 However, Eagle eventually
regained control of her Linkedln account and refused to turn over
certain proprietary information on it or to provide access to its
connections.128 In the ensuing litigation, Edcomm alleged that these
refusals constituted misappropriation of trade secrets.129 The court
dismissed the trade secrets claim, holding that these were not trade
secrets because they were "either generally known in the wider
business community or capable of being easily derived from public
information."130
Collectively, these cases reveal the difficulty of applying trade
secrets law to the issue of social media contacts. Decisions vary based
on how a court chooses to define "secret." Furthermore, although these
cases did not discuss in any detail the fiduciary duty aspect of trade
secrets, the facts do not always clearly reveal whether the employee
had a duty to maintain whatever secrecy attached to the account's
followers. Trade secrets law does not itself provide a mechanism for
determining when this duty exists. This is a particularly gray area in
the world of social media, given how easy social media sites make it
for personal and professional use to overlap. For example, in
122. Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2011 WL 6739448, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2011) (Eagle
123. Id. at *3.
124. Id. at *1.
125. Id. at *1-2.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *2.
129. Id. at *3.
130. Id. at *13. The court did suggest that there may have been enough to support a claim
for misappropriation of an idea had Edcomm been able to show that it had "made a substantial
investment of time, effort, and money [in] creating the . . . Linkedln account." Id.
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PhoneDog, Kravitz's duties included maintaining a Twitter presence
for his employer.131 However, his own imagination produced his posts
and imbued them with his personal voice, which was apparently
engaging enough to accumulate seventeen thousand followers.132
Although trade secrets law does not offer a paradigm for separating
personal and professional presences, analogous areas of intellectual
property law have previously addressed problems that arise when
personal and professional personas overlap.
B. Copyrights and Patents
Broadly stated, copyright and patent law serve the purpose,
like trade secrets law, of fostering originality and creativity.133
However, unlike trade secrets law, which provides protection in
exchange for secrecy, these regimes offer limited periods of total
exclusivity in exchange for complete disclosure for the benefit of the
public.134 Thus, insofar as secrecy is antithetical to the value of social
media contacts, the incentive structure of these forms of intellectual
property may be more appropriate for the social media contacts
analysis. However, copyright and patent law only protect particular
subject matter and do not extend protection to social media contacts.
Nevertheless, copyright and patent law have previously wrestled with
reconciling competing concepts similar to those at stake in the social
media contacts inquiry: on the one hand, the traditional notion that
only individuals can be authors or inventors whose creations result
from personal inspiration; and on the other, the reality of employment
in which individuals exercise that creativity on behalf of a corporate
entity.
Social media's role has shifted from personal recreation to a
major business and marketing tool. The phenomenon of social media
was originally meant for solely personal use among friends, often as a
way to keep in touch. For example, in its infancy, Facebook required a
131. PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8,
2011) (PhoneDog 1).
132. Id. at *1, *4.
133. Joshua I. Miller, Unknown Futures and the Known Past: What Can Patent Learn from
Copyright in the New Technological Age?, 21 ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH. 1, 3-4 (2011). Miller notes
that patent and copyright law perform "closely-related functions" and share "many similarities,"
including "a constitutional mandate 'to promote [p]rogress.' Each grants certain exclusive rights
to the intangible fruits of human creativity and innovation, and permits owners to sue for
infringement of these exclusive rights." Id. (citations omitted).
134. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012) (providing a copyright duration for works created after
January 1, 1978, of the author's life plus seventy years after the author's death), 35 U.S.C. §
154(a)(2) (providing for a term of patent ownership of twenty years from the date of filing of the
patent application).
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".edu" email address. However, over time, businesses began to
recognize Facebook's value in providing a way to connect with their
customers on a more familiar, personal, and approachable level.
Today, social media sites generally offer tools targeted to businesses,
explaining how to attract and maintain customers through the sites.
Thus, examining how intellectual property law has approached
similar competing values can inform a resolution to the issue of rights
to social media contacts.
1. Copyrights
The Copyright Act protects "original works of
authorship . . . fixed in any tangible medium of expression."135 An
"original" work "possess[es] at least some minimal degree of
creativity."13 6 Copyright law grants an author the exclusive right to
copy, distribute, and publicly perform or display the work, as well as
to make derivative works.137 The idea of the "author" that copyright
protects is grounded in the notion that creative works are the result of
an individuals "flash of creative genius."1 38 As Chief Justice Holmes
put it in a seminal copyright case, "[t]he copy is the personal reaction
of an individual upon nature."139
However, the second half of the nineteenth century saw the
rise of corporations, with an attendant increase in authorship on their
behalves, and a parallel rise in judicial recognition of employer
ownership of employee creations.140 Initially, the ownership inquiry
rested on the nature of the employment relationship and its
contractual terms.141 In the absence of an express employment
agreement, courts looked for implied understandings between the
parties in an employment relationship as to whom they intended to
own the copyright.142
135. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a).
136. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
137. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
138. See generally Mario Biagioli, Genius Against Copyright: Revisiting Fichte's Proof of the
Illegality of Reprinting, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1847, 1847-67 (2011) (explaining the origins of
this idea in the law), Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work The Origins of the Work-for-Hire
Doctrine, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 12, 67-68 (2003) (discussing the importance of the role of the
idea of "[t]he romantic conception of authorship as the expression of creative individual genius"
in the development of copyright law).
139. Bleisteinv. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (emphasis added).
140. Fisk, supra note 138, at 68.
141. Id. at 50-54.
142. Id. at 47-55.
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Like the trade secrets law analyses, these were highly fact
driven and, therefore, flexible. For example, in one case, a court
granted copyright in a star catalogue to the observatory director who
compiled it rather than to the college that employed him. 14 3 Of key
importance to the court was the fact that the college did not pay him a
"reasonable salary," which the court interpreted as indicating that it
intended for him to undertake his own independent work as part of his
compensation.14 4 On the other hand, a court in another case granted
copyright to a corporation, rather than the employee who executed the
work, because its "money paid for the painting; its artist colored it; its
president designed it, [and the company's president] was the
'originating, inventive, and master mind.' "145
The early twentieth century saw the roots of the work-made-
for-hire doctrine. After the turn of the century, courts increasingly
granted employers copyrights in employee-made works purely by
virtue of the existence of an employment relationship, without
inquiring on a case-by-case basis into the nature of that relationship
or the parties' expectations.14 6 The 1909 Copyright Act codified this
approach,147 and the Copyright Act of 1976, still in force today, refined
it into the work-made-for-hire doctrine.148 The 1976 Act differentiated
between works created by employees and those created by
independent contractors.149 Copyright ownership vests in an employer,
rather than an employee-creator, if (1) the work is made by an
employee as "part of the scope of his employment" or (2) in the case of
independent contractors, the work falls into one of nine enumerated
categories and there is a written contract manifesting the parties'
intentions to create a work made for hire.1 50 Under the work-made-for-
hire doctrine, the rights that inure to an employer are those of actual
authorship, not merely of an assignment of copyright. 151 In other
words, in the eyes of the law, the employer is the author, and the
employee has no rights to the work, not even of attribution.
By setting a strong default in favor of employers, codification of
the work-made-for-hire doctrine would seem to obviate the need to
143. Peters v. Borst, 9 N.Y.S. 789, 798 (N.Y. Special Term 1889).
144. Fisk, supra note 138, at 52-53 (citing Root v. Borst, 36 N.E. 814, 814 (N.Y. 1894)).
145. Schumacher v. Schwencke, 25 F. 466, 468 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885).
146. Fisk, supra note 138, at 60-62.
147. Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 62, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
148. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.
(2012)).
149. Id. at § 102.
150. Id. at § 101 (emphasis added).
151. Id.
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examine the employment relationship. However, it instead shifted the
question to defining "employee," prompting courts to experiment with
a number of tests for examining employment relationships on an ad
hoc basis.152 In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, the
Supreme Court rejected rigid tests in favor of a flexible agency
analysis that considered factors such as:
the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work;
the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the
right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's
discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's
role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of
the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee
benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party. 153
While copyright law does not settle the question of rights to
social media contacts, the history of how it resolved an issue with
similar tensions is telling. In developing a way to reconcile individuals'
"flashes of creative genius" with the interests of their employers,
courts initially examined the nature of a given employment
relationship to uncover the implied intents of the parties. 154 Even with
a statutory presumption that favors employer ownership of works,
courts still rely on common law agency principles and examine the
precise nature of a given relationship when it is unclear whether the
creator is an "employee" or not.155
2. Patents
Patent law offers another example of the law reconciling
personal creation with employer interests. It incentivizes progress by
offering an inventor the right of exclusion over his invention for a
limited period if the inventor meets certain statutory requirements,
including public disclosure of the invention.15 6 Similar to copyright's
conception of the author, patent law sees an invention as "the product
of original thought"15 7 of the inventor who acts "in an individual flash
of genius."1 58 The status of the individual creator is perhaps even
stronger in patent law than in copyright law: while the copyright
152. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violencev. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 738-39 (1989).
153. Id. at 750-52 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958)).
154. See Root v. Borst, 36 N.E. 814, 814 (N.Y. 1894); Schumacher v. Schwencke, 25 F. 466,
468 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885).
155. See Cmty. for Creative Non- Violence, 490 U.S. at 750-52.
156. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1974).
157. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 188, amended by 289 U.S. 706
(1933).
158. Burk, supra note 86, at 16.
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regime acknowledges corporate employers as authors in certain
circumstances, courts interpret the patent statute to mean that only
natural persons can invent.159 Furthermore, the patent statute does
not have anything equivalent to copyright's work-made-for-hire
provision.160 Inventors may, and frequently do, transfer ownership of
their inventions to corporate entities, but they cannot assign away
their rights of attribution, unlike creators of copyrighted materials
under the work-made-for-hire statute.161
Just like copyright law, the process of invention had to respond
to changes wrought by the industrial revolution and rise of
corporations. These implicated the sometimes disparate interests of
employers and employees.162 Patent law's resolution of this tension,
which drew on common-law agency principles, echoes that of copyright
law, though it has remained uncodified. There are two main situations
in which an employer may obtain rights to an employee's invention.
In the first, an employer hires an employee whose duties the
parties agree, either expressly or impliedly, entail making an
invention or developing a method to solve a particular problem. In this
case, the "hired-to-invent" doctrine applies, and ownership of the
patent transfers to the employer1 63 consistent with contract law's quid-
pro-quo: an invention for consideration of a salary. 164
As the hired-to-invent doctrine has developed, courts have
grappled with what to do when an employment agreement does not
expressly provide that an employee was "hired to invent." To
determine whether it is appropriate to imply such a term of
employment, courts examine the employment relationship at the time
of invention165 and, in particular, the specificity of the task assigned to
159. See Sean M. O'Connor, Hired to Iucent us. Work Made for Hire, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
1227, 1238 (2012); see also Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 187 (stressing that courts recognize "the peculiar
nature of the act of invention ... [i]t is the result of an inventive act, the birth of an idea . . . the
product of original thought . . . ."); Hill, supra note 76.
160. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 390 (2012).
161. David Loretto, Employee Patents on Computer-Implemented Inuentions: The
Conundrum of Separate Ownership of Patent and Copyright, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 705, 716-17
(2002).
162. Intellectual Property Issues in the Employment Setting, 120 INTELL. PROP. COUNS. Art.
1 (2006) ("[A] significant number of all inventions are created by employed inventors."). For a
seminal case on the hired-to-invent doctrine, see Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342 (1890).
163. Loretto, supra note 161, at 715-16.
164. Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 187 ("One employed to make an invention . . . has only produced
that which he was employed to invent . . . . A term of the agreement necessarily is that what he
is paid to produce belongs to his paymaster."); Paul M. Rivard, Protection of Business
Investments in Human Capital: Shop Right and Related Doctrines, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC'Y 753, 754-55 (1997).
165. Banks v. Unisys Corp., 228 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
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the employee that resulted in the invention.166 Employment merely to
perform research or to create an unspecific product that addresses a
general issue is too broad to imply a term of assignment to the
employer.167 On the other hand, if the company hired the employee to
resolve a particular "problem" by achieving a particular result or to
help develop a product and an invention resulted, the court will
consider the employee as having been "hired to invent."168
Two seminal cases on the hired-to-invent doctrine illustrate
this point. In Standard Parts, a principal of the plaintiff company
knew the defendant both personally and professionally.169 The parties
entered a contract under which the defendant would develop a
machine and process "for the production of the front spring now used
on the product of the Ford Motor Company" in return for a stipulated
payment.170 When they disputed ownership of the patent to the
resulting invention, the Supreme Court held that it rightfully
belonged to the employer.171 The Court looked to the language of the
contract, which it said expressly identified a specific invention for
which it promised adequate compensation.172
On the other hand, in Dubilier, the Court held that an
employee who oversaw a division tasked with a number of design
projects that all related generally to "airplane radio" was not obligated
to assign his invention to his employer.173 In that case, the Bureau of
Standards undertook forty-four research projects on behalf of the Air
Corps of the Army, six of which were assigned to the radio section.174
In the course of working on the projects, two employees began
experimenting with an idea that, although related to radio technology,
did not address the research projects they were assigned.175 They
developed and reduced these ideas to practice at their own expense,
and while they worked on them at their employer's laboratory, they
166. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 22.03 (1997).
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Standard Parts Co. v. Peck, 264 U.S. 52, 59 (1924) (finding that defendant had
been hired to invent when the employment contract stated that he would "devote his time to the
development of a process and machinery" to resolve a particular problem and that the plaintiff
would pay him in return for his efforts).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 59-60.
172. Id.
173. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 184, 208-09, amended by 289
U.S. 706 (1933).
174. Id. at 184.
175. Id. at 184-85.
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did so with their supervisor's knowledge and approval.176 The Court
noted that the patent regime differentiates between an inventive idea
and its embodiment and stressed that patent law protects the
former.177 Therefore, unless the employer contracts with its employee
specifically for the former, the employee retains her right to it. 178
The second scenario giving an employer rights to an employee
invention occurs in cases, like Dubilier, in which the employer has an
interest in the invention even though the employment relationship is
not specific enough for a court to assign the patent to the employer. An
employer may hire an employee for general employment in a field, and
the employee may then invent something within that field. The
circumstances of employment may give the employer an interest in the
invention, for example, if it relates to the field of employment or was
developed with the employer's resources. In such cases, the inventor
owns the patent while the employer receives a "shop right": a
nonexclusive, nontransferable, royalty-free license to use the invention
in the business.179 Essentially, the employer can use the invention in
the course of running the business, even after termination of
employment, without the risk of an infringement suit and without
paying a royalty. However, the employee retains ownership of the
patent itself and its attendant rights, including the right to exclude all
others from using it.180
The shop-right rule rests on doctrines of implied contract,
estoppel, and equity.181 These rationales are not mutually exclusive;
courts' determinations of whether a shop right exists depend on which
doctrine they afford the most weight.182 The implied contract theory
stresses whether, and to what extent, the employee made use of the
employer's time and/or materials in the invention.183 Based on
estoppel, courts consider whether the employee somehow manifested
consent to the employer's use of the invention.184 The equity rationale
is based on an interest in fairness to the employer, since the employee
176. Id. at 185.
177. Id. at 188.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 179-88; Burk, supra note 86, at 16; Loretto, supra note 161, at 717.
180. See Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 189.
181. Burk, supra note 86, at 16; Loretto, supra note 161, at 720-23; Scott P. Sandrock, The
Evolution andModern Application of the Shop Right Rule, 38 BUS. LAW. 953, 965-68 (1983).
182. Rivard, supra note 164, at 762 ("The shop right is . . . a common law right, having its
roots in each of these doctrines, which attaches whenever the circumstances demand it.").
183. Sandrock, supra note 181, at 966.
184. Loretto, supra note 161, at 721.
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developed the invention "us[ing] his master's time, facilities and
materials . . . ."185
Courts look to the nature of the employment relationship and
the actions of the parties to determine whether there was an exchange
amounting to consideration.186 The Federal Circuit has adopted a fact-
specific inquiry that considers the "totality of the circumstances," in
light of "principles of equity and fairness"18 7 and, in particular, "the
circumstances surrounding the development of the patented invention
and the inventor's activities respecting that invention, once
developed."188 In general, a shop-right inquiry examines "whether the
invention relates to the duties of the employee, . . . falls within the
scope of the employer's business, and ... was created with materials
supplied by the employer or was developed during working hours."189
The standard factors courts consider are: (1) whether the employee
made unreimbursed use of the employer's facilities in perfecting the
invention, (2) whether the invention was made on company time, and
(3) whether the employee consented or acquiesced in the employer's
use of the invention.190 Thus, in Dubilier, the employer was entitled to
a shop right in the invention because it related to airplane radio
technology, the field of employment involved, and had been developed
using the employer's laboratory resources.191
In sum, although copyright and patent law methods of
allocating original rights of authorship and invention diverge, when
allotting rights between employers and employees, they have followed
similar paths and reached similar conclusions. When courts first
began granting copyrights to employers, they did so based on an
examination of the employment relationship at issue and looked for an
implied understanding between the parties regarding ownership,
including whether the employee received adequate consideration for
copyright to vest in an employer. Even after the codification of the
default rule in favor of employers, courts continue to examine some
employment relationships on a case-by-case basis, using agency law
principles to determine whether a creator is an "employee" under the
185. Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 188-89.
186. See Loretto, supra note 161, at 720 ("[T]he actions of both employee and employer are
examined to determine whether they lead to the conclusion that the employee allowed the
employer to use the invention in exchange for assistance from the employer . . . .").
187. McElmurryv. Ark. Power & Light Co., 995 F.2d 1576, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
188. Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 188-89.
189. Burk, supra note 86, at 16, see alsoDubilier, 289 U.S. at 188.
190. GREGORY E. UPCHURCH, IP LITIGATION GUIDE: PATENTS & TRADE SECRETS § 14:40
(2003).
191. Dublier, 289 U.S. at 188-89.
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statute. The shop-right analysis often resembles the pre-work-made-
for-hire doctrine analysis in its examination of a particular
employment relationship, including whether there was adequate
compensation. Indeed, two of the factors of the standard shop-right
analysis, whether an employee made unreimbursed use of the
employer's facilities and whether the employee developed the
invention on company time, overlap with the work-made-for-hire
agency factors that inquire into the source of materials and the
location of the work.
IV. A PATENT SOLUTION TO SOCIAL MEDIA CONTACTS
As previously discussed, the trade secrets law framework that
most courts confronted with this question have used provides an
incomplete solution to this problem.192 Among this framework's
shortcomings, it requires difficult determinations regarding whether
contacts were secret, whether they have independent value, and
whether a duty existed to keep them secret. In addition, social media
contacts only qualify as trade secrets if a particular jurisdiction does
not define "secret" literally but instead considers the length and
complexity of the contact list. Finally, a claim for misappropriation of
trade secrets requires that there was a duty to maintain the secrecy of
the information. Due to the nature of social media accounts, it is not
always clear whether such a duty exists.
Drawing on the law's previous resolutions of similar tensions
when confronting new technology provides a way to avoid these
difficulties. By design, patent and copyright law protect creations that,
like social media account followers, are available to the public. Each
has also called on agency law to determine rights as between an
employer and employee while maintaining their regime's incentive
structures. Copyright law's work-made-for-hire doctrine requires a
fact-sensitive examination into whether the author of the work is an
employee. Patent law's inquiry into whether an employee was hired-
to-invent and its shop-right rule provide a fact-based analysis of the
employment relationship. Both of these approaches accommodate the
variety of uses that individuals and firms make of social media
accounts. In particular, patent law's solutions provide a template for
how to proceed once the analysis of parties' rights is complete. These
solutions protect both the personality of the individual creator as
expressed in his flash of creative or inventive genius and the
192. Supra Part III.A.
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investment and expectations of the employer who provided the
platform, time, and opportunity to realize that genius.
Therefore, following the shop-right and hired-to-invent
doctrines can resolve the question of rights to social media followers.
An inquiry analogous to that used in patent law to determine whether
to apply the hired-to-invent doctrine or the shop-right rule can be used
to determine the nature of the employment relationship with regard to
the social media account. If a court finds that the employee is in a
position analogous to that of an employee hired to invent, the
employee's rights to access the account to communicate with its
contacts would terminate with her employment. Since an account's
contacts are publicly available, this would not prevent the former
employee from reaching out to the account's contacts on her own.
However, actually rebuilding the list would likely be a long and
tedious process given the number of social media contacts many
company accounts have. Furthermore, this would be no different from
what the employee would do at her new employment anyway: seek out
and contact social media users likely to be interested in the company.
If circumstances exist hat would grant an employer a shop
right in an analogous patent situation, the employer would have
access to the contacts for purposes of furthering the business both
during and after the employee's term of employment. However, the
employee should have ultimate control of the account and retain
access to it and its contacts after her employment ends, while the
former employer's ability to access the account to communicate with
its contacts should terminate. Social media accounts cannot be
duplicated or their contacts copied from one account to another.
Therefore, as a practical matter, when an employee terminates
employment, the employer should be able to notify the account's
followers of that fact and provide them with information about how to
remain a contact of the employer.
In importing the hired-to-invent and shop-right doctrines to
resolve the issue of social media accounts, the different policy issues at
stake should be considered. The patent regime is carefully designed to
encourage invention that will benefit the public at large. Therefore,
the system counterbalances the weight afforded the individual flash of
genius with incentives to employers who are in the position to invest
resources in developing those inventions. Social media accounts and
their followers simply do not carry the same stakes. Social media do
undoubtedly offer enormous benefits to business in facilitating
publicity, advertising, and communication with the public. While they
also offer benefits to the public, these are not as far-reaching as the
telegraph, an herbicide -resistant plant, or a cancer drug, innovations
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of the kind that the patent regime protects. In addition, while these all
take enormous time and resources to create, social media accounts are
free and user-friendly. Considering these lower stakes, there is less
reason or need to offer incentives to employers to invest in social
media. Therefore, the analysis should take care not to blindly follow
the patent system and to bear in mind that employers will likely
continue to invest in social media accounts and employees to manage
them regardless of the legal incentives.
A. Hired-to-Invent in Social Media
Patent law's hired-to-invent doctrine would apply in the social
media context when a company hires someone specifically to manage
its social media accounts. As in the patent context, this would satisfy
the contractual quid pro quo: maintenance of a creative social media
presence in exchange for compensation. It would also preserve the
incentive structure: employees' compensation would serve as incentive
to continue to maintain the social media account, and give employers
assurance that employees would not use social media accounts, and
the access to followers that they provide, to compete with employers
when they leave. In turn, this would encourage employers to invest in
effective, creative social media.
This would apply to the scenario in PhoneDog. Though the
precise terms of Kravitz's contract were not enumerated during
litigation, it is clear that he had been hired as a "product reviewer and
video blogger"193 and that he maintained a Twitter account bearing
both PhoneDog's and his names to which he posted his reviews. 194 He
used his expertise about mobile technology along with his personal
style and opinions to attract followers to PhoneDog, and though his
posts may have had a personal tone and content, the account's
purpose was ultimately to attract new customers and produce
advertising revenue for PhoneDog.195 The necessary quid pro quo was
present to satisfy the hired-to-invent doctrine: PhoneDog provided
Kravitz compensation in exchange for his efforts at attracting new
followers and maintaining the Twitter account. Applying the patent
framework here would bypass the difficult and slippery trade secrets
analysis. The court would not have to grapple with whether a public
list could be considered "secret" by virtue of containing seventeen
193. PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8,
2011) (PhoneDog 1).
194. Id.
195. See PhoneDog I, 2012 WL 273323 at *2.
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thousand names. Nor would it have to determine whether the value of
the contacts derived independent value based on that secrecy, let
alone what that value was.
Just as in the patent context, the hired-to-invent analysis
would prove more complicated in situations in which it is less clear
whether an employee's compensation covered her involvement with
social media. Therefore, when there is a written contract, courts
should look to the specificity of the tasks assigned as the Court did in
Standard Parts. If there is not a written contract, courts should look
to the nature of the employment relationship itself, as in Dubilier.
For example, in Christou, the precise contours of Roulier's
duties with regard to the MySpace accounts were not clear from the
available facts. Roulier worked for Christou as a talent buyer and
helped to book DJs for Christou's clubs,196 and Christou alleged that
Roulier was also paid to assist in maintaining Christou's clubs'
MySpace pages.197 If that allegation were true and Roulier's
compensation was intended to cover his attention to the MySpace
account, then the hired-to-invent framework would apply. To
determine that, a court would have to look closely at the nature of the
employment relationship and what both parties' expectations were in
entering it. A court might consider on whose initiative the accounts
were created-whether Christou, someone else in charge of the clubs,
or Roulier himself. It might also consider whether other employees
also had access to and regularly maintained the accounts and whether
Christou regarded the accounts as a business tool.
B. Shop Rights to Social Media Accounts
The shop-right scenario would apply in cases in which
employees use social media in connection with their employment, even
though their duties do not expressly, or even impliedly, include
maintaining social media accounts. This would include scenarios in
which employees have pre-existing personal social media accounts to
which they actively and regularly post work-related information, such
as a real estate broker who systematically posts status updates about
upcoming open houses, or a retail clerk who frequently tweets about
new inventory or upcoming sales. Their social media use would not be
the reasons for which these individuals were hired, but, like in
Dubilier, it would relate to their work, possibly resulting in business
196. Christou v. Beatport, LLC, 849 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1062 (D. Colo. 2012).
197. Complaint and Jury Demand at 128, Christou v. Beatport, LLC, 849 F. Supp. 2d
1055, 1062 (D. Colo. 2012) (No. 10-cv-02912-RBJ-KM T).
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for their employers, and would use the employers' resources,
particularly in the form of time. The shop right would also apply to
cases in which employees who are strongly identified with their
companies, such as high-ranking executives, use social media only
incidentally to their employment, for example, a company executive
who maintains a personal Facebook account or has a Linkedln account
listing his or her complete work and educational history.
Given the nature of digital social media, the first shop-right
factor, unreimbursed use of the employer's facilities, would entail both
tangible and intangible facilities. Factors will necessarily vary widely
across industries, as they do in the patent context. Generally, courts
might consider the frequency with which employees access the account
from a work computer as opposed to a personal computer. Courts can
consider whether, and to what extent, employees used their company's
trademarks, website links, or copyrighted material in their social
media accounts. Factors unique to social media would also come into
play. For example, courts can consider whether the account name
references the employer, as did the Twitter handle in PhoneDog.198
Such a reference would suggest that a contact's interest in the account
is based, at least in part, on the employer.
This prong of the shop-right analysis would more neatly resolve
a primary concern of courts that have addressed this issue and one
that trade secrets law has struggled to accommodate: resource
investment. The PhoneDog court emphasized that Kravitz's Twitter
account had seventeen thousand contacts, represented a significant
investment of time and resources, and would take considerable effort
to replicate. The Christou court similarly emphasized the "money,
time, and resources"199 that Christou had expended in developing the
list, as well as the fact that replication would require contacting
thousands of people, not all of whom would necessarily agree to
connect.200 Both of these courts considered these facts under the
secrecy prong of the trade secrets analysis, despite the fact that the
lists of contacts were literally public. Adopting the hired-to-invent and
shop-right analyses would allow courts to consider these facts as an
investment of resources instead of forcing them into an ill-fitting
secrecy model.
The second shop-right factor, whether the invention was made
on company time, should consider both the particular employment
context and the fact that, unlike copyrightable works or patentable
198. PhoneDog I, 2012 WL 273323, at *4.
199. Christou, 849 F. Supp. 2d at 1076.
200. Id.
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inventions, social media accounts are accessible at any time, on or off
the clock. For example, a nine-to-five employee who regularly posts
content to an account during business hours uses employer resources,
which would weigh in favor of a shop right. If the same employee
instead maintains the account primarily outside of those hours, it
would indicate that the account was for primarily personal use. In
addition, this would not represent an investment of the employer.
Some employees are so closely associated with their
occupations that it is hard or impossible to dissociate them from their
professional identities or to say that they ever are "off the clock." This
would likely be the case with a company executive high enough in
rank to owe fiduciary duties. For example, Sonya Soutus, Senior Vice
President of Public Affairs and Communications at Coca-Cola, tweets
both about her company and her personal life. 201 In such a case, the
court should rely less heavily on this factor or disregard it altogether.
The social media context also influences the final shop-right
factor, consent to the employer's use. Here again, using the employer's
name on the account could signal consent, as could use of the
employer's trademarks, copyright, or links to its website. Another
consideration should be whether the employee regularly posts
material about the employer or material that the employer encourages
her to post, as this would strongly indicate the employee's consent to
use the account on behalf of the employer. This would be a
particularly strong indicator of consent in the case of a social media
site such as Linkedln, whose terms of service stipulate that individual
users have ownership rights to their own accounts.202 If the employee
gives the employer the password to an account that the employee
started, as in Eagle,203 this should weigh even more strongly in favor
of granting a shop right, since it directly manifests the employee's
willingness for the employer to use and control the account.
Additionally, if the employee does not actually give the password but
does allow the employer to exercise control over it (for example, by
reviewing its content and providing templates, as in Eagle),204 this
would also indicate consent.
If there is sufficient basis for a shop right, both the employer
and the employee should have access to the contact list before and
after employment ends. Since at least some followers would have
201. See Argento, supra note 1, at 219-220.
202. User Agreement, supra note 44.
203. Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2011 WL 6739448 at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2011) (Eagle
1).
204. Id. at *3.
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followed the account based on interest in the company, the company
should be able to maintain these connections after the employee
departs. On the other hand, since an employee's personal expression,
attributes, and creativity play as important a role in attracting social
media contacts as in the process of invention, the employee should
also be able to have continued access to the contact list after
employment ends. Moreover, individual social media users have the
discretion to create or sever connections with other users. If followers
are only interested in an employer's company, they can cancel their
connection to an employee's account should that employee leave the
company.
In practical terms, the employee would maintain direct access
to the account and its followers, while the employer's access would
terminate. Before the employee leaves, the employer could obtain a
list of the account's followers and contact each of them. Alternatively,
the employee could post a message on her account informing her
followers of her new employment and how to stay connected to her
former employer.
Applying this analysis to the hypothetical in Part I would
result in the departing employee owning the account and the company
retaining a shop right to it. It is conceivable that the employee would
have updated social media accounts using a company computer and
that she would have used any trademarks the company might have
had. Given that she was a founding member of the company, the
second factor, creation during work hours, would be less relevant. This
employee would be similar to Sonya Soutus in that her high-profile
role in the company would identify her with it so strongly that it
would be difficult to say that she was ever actually "off the clock."
Social media shop rights would also apply to the circumstances
in Eagle v. Morgan. In that case, Linda Eagle created her Linkedln
account on her own initiative but soon used it to promote Edcomm.
Eventually, Edcomm actively encouraged all its employees to use
Linkedln to promote the business and provided guidelines on doing
so.2 0 5 Thus, Eagle's personal profile, like that of any Edcomm
employee, reflected her personal achievements and could be used to
further her own career. On the other hand, Edcomm manifested its
interest in the accounts of Eagle and all of its employees by
encouraging them to maintain such accounts. Moreover, providing
employees with instructions on how to do so indicates use of firm
resources in creating the accounts. Furthermore, the fact that Eagle
gave Edcomm the password to her account strongly indicates her
205. Id.
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consent for Edcomm to use her account on its own behalf. Thus, under
a shop-right analysis, Edcomm would have been able to continue to
use the list of contacts after Eagle left the company, while Eagle would
retain ownership and control of the account itself and the followers
associated with it, unless they themselves chose to terminate the
connection.
In Eagle v. Morgan, these factors would grant Edcomm a shop
right in Eagle's Linkedln account. In that case, most employees came
to Edcomm with existing Linkedln accounts, which they had
presumably created on their own to support their personal
professional development.206 Edcomm provided them with a company
template to use and encouraged them to post a link to Edcomm's
information on their individual profiles. 207 Therefore, it is possible
that some of Edcomm's Linkedln contacts discovered the company via
Edcomm employees' profiles. Furthermore, their employees would
likely have used work computers to add the Edcomm information to
their profiles and have done so on the clock. Finally, doing so would
demonstrate the employees' consent to let Edcomm use their accounts
for its benefit.
V. CONCLUSION
Social media present many new problems that cause the legal
community to struggle to adapt existing legal rules to their unique
demands, at least in the absence of an employment contract or policy
that addresses them. One little-explored example is rights to social
media contacts. Due to the unique nature of social media accounts and
the different ways that businesses and their employees use them, they
blur their users' personal and professional identities. As a result, both
the employee and the employer frequently maintain concurrent, and
often competing, interests in access to the account's followers. Though
trade secrets law, with its relatively flexible schema, intuitively
appears to offer a promising method to deal with this issue, it
ultimately proves inadequate to address the unique problems posed by
social media. Examining how copyright and patent law have
previously resolved similar tensions reveals the utility of importing
patent law's shop-right and hired-to-invent analyses into the social
media context. When this analysis shows that maintaining the
account was specifically included in the employee's compensated
duties, either explicitly or impliedly, the employer should have the
206. Id. at *3--8.
207. Id. at *3.
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right to the account and its contacts as against the employee. In
addition, a shop right should inure to an employer that has a strong
interest in the account and its followers as long as the situation would
satisfy that doctrine's underlying theories of contract law, estoppel,
and equity.
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